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Abstract—Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) and Fog are emerging computing models that extend the cloud and its services to the edge
of the network. The emergence of both MEC and fog introduce new requirements, which mean their supported deployment models
must be investigated. In this paper, we point out the influence and strong impact of the extended cloud (i.e., the MEC and fog) on
existing communication and networking service models of the cloud. Although the relation between them is fairly evident, there are
important properties, notably those of security and resilience, that we study in relation to the newly posed requirements from the MEC
and fog. Although security and resilience have been already investigated in the context of the cloud - to a certain extent - existing
solutions may not be applicable in the context of the extended cloud. Our approach includes the examination of models and
architectures that underpin the extended cloud, and we provide a contemporary discussion on the most evident characteristics
associated with them. We examine the technologies that implement these models and architectures, and analyse them with respect to
security and resilience requirements. Furthermore, approaches to security and resilience-related mechanisms are examined in the
cloud (specifically, anomaly detection and policy based resilience management), and we argue that these can also be applied in order
to improve security and achieve resilience in the extended cloud environment.
Index Terms—Cloud computing, cloud resilience, edge computing, mobile edge computing, fog computing, cloud security.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing technologies are becoming increas-ingly important since they provide a wide range of ben-
eficial properties, such as on-demand self-services, resource
pooling, rapid elasticity, measured services, etc. Although
several technologies are used for the conceptualisation of
the cloud model, the main enabling technology is virtualisa-
tion [1]. Cloud technologies have managed to mature over
the years, to the extent that major companies, such as Ama-
zon, Google, Ebay, etc., invested a lot of their resources in
developing and using cloud infrastructures for the provision
of their services. Many organisations now face the question
as to when and how to cloudify their existing IT infras-
tructures. According to a survey, conducted by the Cloud
Industry Forum (CIF)1, 63% of UK businesses are planning
to migrate their entire IT infrastructure to the cloud in the
near future. CIF also recorded the opinion of 250 senior IT
and business decision makers at the end of 2015, and found
that 78% of UKs organisations are already using the cloud.
This indicates an increase of 53% between 2011 and 2015.
Moreover, it is predicted that by 2018, approximately 85%
of businesses will use the cloud [2].
The main reasons for the cloud’s increased popularity lie
in its supported business models, which eventually result
in reducing costs and offering greater scalability and on-
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demand resource provisioning services. Since most cloud
providers specialise in both hardware and software tech-
nologies, cloud users can be relieved of the need to have
in-house teams to conduct maintenance operations on the
infrastructure. Motivated primarily by economies of scale,
cloud environments are also being used by sectors oper-
ating in the area of critical infrastructures [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7]. Further characteristics of the cloud (e.g., support of
ubiquitous connectivity, elasticity, scalable resources and
ease of deployment) render these computing environments
applicable in domains such as the Internet of Things (IoT)
– sensors, mobile devices etc., [8]. This emerging trend
of IoT deployments is introducing new requirements that
existing cloud settings cannot satisfy adequately [9], [10],
[11]. These requirements include, but are not limited to, geo-
distribution, low latency, location awareness, and mobility
support [12], [13].
In order to fulfil the above mentioned requirements,
the research community has proposed new technologies,
namely the the edge [14] and fog [15]. These technolo-
gies, which we collectively label the extended cloud, allow
computing needs to be performed closer to the source of
data. Eventually this will improve the quality of provided
services since it would result in reducing the delay in
conveying data between end nodes and the cloud. A typical
conceptual architecture of the extended cloud is shown in
Fig. 1. These technologies enable the support of new applica-
tions and services, e.g., Google Now2 and Foursquare3 that
2. https://www.google.co.uk/landing/now/
3. https://foursquare.com
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are both location-aware applications for mobile platforms.
Further types of supported application include, amongst
others, traffic control management for autonomous vehicles,







Fig. 1. The extended cloud
The edge or Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) and fog
models offer similar, yet different methods for monitoring,
processing, and conveying data. Moreover, each model has
its own advantages and disadvantages, which make them
individually preferable in different scenarios. Edge comput-
ing refers to data processing at the edge of a network close
to the data source. For example, sensors in industrial IoT
applications can capture streaming data towards optimising
the production. This is generally achieved by connecting
sensors to Programmable Automation Controllers (PAC)
that handle processing and communication. In the case of
edge computing, IT and cloud computing capabilities are
provided within the Radio Access Network (RAN), which is
close to mobile subscribers. This results in offering context
aware application and services with ultra-low latency and
high-bandwidth requirements [17]. By contrast, fog com-
puting necessitates data processing from the edge to the
cloud. It allows data collection, processing and storage at
the local area network end of the device using a fog node;
hence it offers less latency when compared to the cloud.
Compared to edge computing, fog is more scalable as it
offers a centralised model for processing data. However,
the edge model has an advantage over the fog, as there are
fewer points of failure. Specifically, devices are more inde-
pendent in terms of decision making, i.e., making decisions
on whether information should be stored locally or sent to
the cloud. Table. 1 provides comparative information among
the cloud, edge and fog models – compiled by Cisco4 – and
highlights some of the limitations in the cloud with regard
to real-time application requirements. These new computing
models provide a new ecosystem and an opportunity for
providers to collaborate and develop new business models.
This is feasible through the deployment of new services
4. http://blogs.cisco.com/perspectives/iot-from-cloud-to-fog-
computing
for users and tenants based on their service requirements.
Nevertheless, the edge and fog do not replace the cloud,
but rather we consider them as a non-trivial extension of
cloud. Crucially, security and resilience issues in the context
TABLE 1
Cloud computing vs. Fog and Edge computing
Requirements Cloud Computing Fog/Edge Computing
Latency High Low
Location of Service Within the Internet At the edge of the lo-
cal network
Geo-distribution Centralized Distributed
Mobility Limited support High support
Location awareness No Yes





Multiple hops One hop
of cloud computing can be foreseen to impact both edge and
fog. We now elaborate on these vital security and resilience
concerns in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.
1.1 Security Aspects
In spite of the merits imposed by moving to the edge and
fog, a shift to the extended cloud brings its own challenges.
In cloud environments users have less control over the
hardware, software and data. The loss of control over data
and lack of transparency give rise to many security con-
cerns, which cause uncertainty for organisations that want
to ‘cloudify’ their IT infrastructure. This is highlighted in
recent reports published by Vision, which show an increased
reluctance by companies to migrate their infrastructure to
the cloud due to security concerns [18]. Similarly, another
recent study by Alert Logic states that application attacks
aimed at cloud deployments grew by 45% over the period
of a year [19]. The complexity of the underlying infras-
tructures also introduce a number of challenges, including
misconfiguration, and malware. Furthermore, failures in the
cloud may incur significant costs. For instance, on the 29th
of June, 2010, amazon.com experienced problems in placing
orders using its platform. Based on their 2010 quarterly
revenues, such downtime resulted in a loss of approximately
$1.75 million per hour to Amazon. More recently in another
incident, on October 21st, 2016, dyn.com suffered from a
high speed Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack that
affected numerous websites. In this case, enterprises that
relied on Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) for running critical
business operations experienced failures. Thus, we argue
that due to the widespread use of cloud infrastructures
for hosting critical services, any potential disruption in the
cloud would have a great impact on the reliant services,
e.g., in health, safety, security or economic well-being of
citizens or the effective functioning of governments [20],
[21]. While some issues can be addressed using existing
mechanisms (see Section 4), there are additional threats to
the edge and fog, which pose risks to the cloud. Sections 2
IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS 3
and 3 highlight some of these threats in the mobile edge and
fog, respectively.
1.2 Resilience as a Cloud Requirement
Failures in cloud services may result in having a great im-
pact on the security and safety of the virtualised infrastruc-
tures, and therefore render the requirement of supporting
resilience in the cloud more important than even before.
Resilience is defined as the ‘ability of a system to provide an
acceptable level of service in the presence of challenges’ [22].
The acceptable level of service in the above definition de-
pends on user expectation. Nowadays, users require instan-
taneous access to information that is available at all times:
the always-on, always-available service. Due to the presence
of various challenges, resilience is sometimes evaluated
through two key metrics, i.e., recovery time objective (RTO)
and recovery point objective (RPO). RTO refers to the dura-
tion of time within which a system must be restored after
a disruption to avoid a break in business continuity, and
RPO refers to the nearest point to where a system may be
recovered after a disruption [23]. Furthermore, resilience
is concerned not only with the Availability of services, but
also with maintaining the Confidentiality and Integrity of the
information in the face of challenges [9].
Resilience needs to become a fundamental property of
the cloud service provisioning platforms. However, the in-
nate and often desirable properties offered by cloud-based
models – such as elasticity, virtualisation, scalability and
geo-distribution of devices – render the implementation of
standard resilience solutions more problematic.
• Elasticity in the cloud computing refers to the dynamic
adaptation of capacity to meet workload demands. It is
defined as ‘the degree to which a system is able to adapt
to workload changes by provisioning and de-provisioning
resources in an autonomic manner, such that at each point
in time the available resources match the current demand
as closely as possible’ [24], [25]. Providing resilience and
service guarantees in the presence of various challenges
requires resources in terms of redundant storage for
backup-recovery and additional network capacity, etc.
However, due to varying customer workloads and the
requirement of elasticity in the cloud, resource alloca-
tion and availability is constantly changing making it
difficult to provide resilience and service guarantees.
Service providers are faced with the challenge of de-
termining how an application on the cloud (e.g. a fog
node) should be configured, and how much of the
resources should be protected.
• Virtualisation in cloud computing also introduces new
sources of threats and failures. Complex interactions
between the applications, and workloads sharing the
same physical infrastructure make it difficult to predict
demands. When it comes to the provision of virtual
resources, cloud virtualisation must extend beyond the
data center to reach the edge and fog nodes. This
extension further reduces control over the underlying
physical hardware. The difficulty of predicting inter-
actions and adapting the system accordingly makes it
hard to provide dependability guarantees in terms of
availability and responsiveness, as well as resilience to
external perturbations such as security attacks [26].
• The extended cloud environments achieve higher util-
isation of physical resources through the consolidation
of workloads. However, this makes them more vulnera-
ble to threats resulting from unpredictable resource de-
mands as well as operational failures, such as hardware
and software failures, unforeseen load fluctuations, net-
work attacks, etc.
• The geographical distribution in edge/fog based ser-
vice architectures introduces various dependencies that
impede the satisfaction of SLAs. This distribution may
be between clients and services, as well as the physical
infrastructure behind services. Cloud providers are cop-
ing with the need for assuring the availability and reli-
ability (i.e. resilience) of services, which are distributed
over the extended cloud architecture. The geograph-
ical distribution may also impose legal and privacy
implications when data is hosted on outsourced and
shared infrastructures that are under a different legal
jurisdiction than that of the owner of the data. Privacy
clauses in legislation – such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (HIPAA)5
and the Telecommunications Act of 19966, as well as
financial regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act7 –
obstruct the applicability of extended cloud solutions
in their respective industries, and may adversely affect
resilience.
The extended cloud model is multifaceted since services
may be provided by an assortment of heterogeneous plat-
forms, and resources may be shared between entities. The
applications running on these platforms may employ best
practices to varying degrees, and thus result in increasing
the risk of unforeseen threats. These risks are exacerbated
due to multiple administrative domains between the ap-
plication and infrastructure operators, and reduce the end-
to-end system visibility. To best of our knowledge, there is
limited understanding on how to provide resilience mech-
anisms for the extended cloud that can collectively address
the various challenges in a coordinated manner.
1.2.1 Resilience Strategy
The ResumeNet8 project evaluated a framework whereby a
number of resilience principles and a strategy (i.e. D2R2+DR
for Defend, Detect, Remediate, Recover, Diagnose and Re-
fine) are defined, which is outlined in Fig. 2. At its core, a
control loop offers a number of conceptual processes that
are used to realise the real-time aspect of the D2R2+DR
strategy and consequently implement resilience; this can
be exploited in introducing resilience for the cloud. Based
on the resilience control loop, other necessary elements for
the detection of challenges and remediation can be derived,
such as anomaly detection and policy engines respectively,
that aim to build situational awareness and control mecha-
nisms.
Under the D2R2+DR framework, there must exist com-
ponents that are capable of reconfiguring devices, in re-






















Fig. 2. The D2R2+DR resilience strategy [22]
not apply to the same components on which the detection
was based. A policy engine is responsible for mapping
detection events to reconfigurations, accepting a resilience
strategy expressed as a collection of policies. The generic
nature of D2R2+DR makes it ideal for application to the
extended cloud. For illustration purposes, Fig. 3 provides
a high-level mapping of the D2R2 part of the strategy to the
reference architecture for Mobile Edge Cloud architecture
from ETSI9. The mobile edge platform operator has access
to physical devices, and some virtual components hosting
the applications, which can be monitored to inform the
detection process. The operator can also reconfigure these
devices and applications, in response to detected challenges
using policies. At the network level, D2R2 may exist as mon-
itoring and reconfiguration points. Within the inner D2R2
loop, some interaction between architecture layers may exist
in the form of events and reconfigurability exposed by the
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Fig. 3. A resilience-oriented view of the MEC reference architecture [27]
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 and Section 3 focus on the mobile edge archi-
tecture and the fog respectively, from a unique perspective
of security and resilience. Section 4 discusses security and
resilience requirements in the cloud and considers the im-
plementation of resilience mechanisms towards an overall
cloud architecture. Finally, we provide concluding remarks
in Section 5.
9. http://www.etsi.org/
2 MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING
Mobile wireless communication has received a lot of at-
tention and has become hugely popular during the past
decade. This is mostly due to the emergence of mobile
devices, such as smart-phones and tablets. These devices
are usually equipped with multi-core processors, various
sensors (e.g., high-quality camera, GPS, barometer, etc.), as
well as running a plethora of applications that managed to
improve the productivity of mobile users.
Meanwhile, there is an increased demand for ever higher
bandwidth rates when connecting to the Internet, and thus
a need for new designs when it comes to next generation
mobile networks (notably 5G). Some of its characteristics
include the support of 1000× the number of connected
devices, 100× the user data rate, 1/5× the end-to-end delay
and 1/1000× the service deployment time [28].
Some 5G goals include the enhancement of traditional
mobile services (e.g. telephony services) and provision of
new services/applications (e.g, IoT, vehicular communica-
tion, augmented reality, live video streaming, mobile gam-
ing, mobile crowd sensing, etc.). Common requirements of
these examples are the demand for higher bandwidth rates,
computing resources and very low delays when accessing
services. The European 5G PPP (Infrastructure Public Pri-
vate Partnership) research body recognises Mobile Edge
Computing (MEC) to be one of the key technologies for 5G
networks [29].
MEC was initially defined by IBM and Nokia Siemens
to describe the computing facilities within a mobile base
station. Toward its standardisation, the European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI) launched an Indus-
try Specification Group (ISG) in December 2014 (i.e. ISG
MEC) that resulted in producing documents providing a
series of specifications for the MEC framework [27] and an
architecture [30]. MEC is defined by ETSI to be capable of
providing ‘... an IT service environment and cloud computing
capabilities at the edge of the mobile network to reduce latency,
ensure highly efficient network operation and service delivery,
and offer an improved user experience’. The MEC definition
has recently been extended to apply to multiple commu-
nication technologies and referred to as Multiple-access
Edge Computing. However, in this paper, we choose to
use the definition provided by the ETSI MEC ISG (we also
call it edge for short). Next, we introduce, initially, mobile
services/applications that can serve as use-cases for the
MEC model. For the deployment of services, we review
the ETSI ISG reference architecture and framework. Finally,
we elaborate on the security and resilience challenges, and
provide our thoughts for the future of the MEC.
2.1 MEC Reference Architecture
The ETSI GS MEC 003 V1.1.1 (2016-03) document specifies a
framework and reference architecture for the MEC [30]. The
framework describes the structure of the MEC environment,
and the reference architecture illustrates the main functional
blocks and defined reference points between them.
Fig. 4 depicts the proposed MEC reference architecture,
where the general entities and their functional blocks are
illustrated. Entities are grouped in three levels, namely host
level, network level and system level.
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The Mobile Edge (ME) host and network: The host
level is represented by the middle level of MECs reference
architecture. It includes the ME host and ME host manage-
ment entities. The ME host is comprised of the virtualisation
infrastructure (VI) and the ME platform and applications.
The VI provides the computing, storage and networking in-
frastructure for running ME applications. The ME platform
facilitates the running of ME applications on a particular
virtualised infrastructure and provides ME applications as
services. Specifically, the platform provides the ability to
advertise, discover and consume ME applications through
a service registry. The ME platform also applies traffic rules
and provides DNS services. The network level provides the
connectivity between internal and external entities of MEC.
The ME management: The ME management task is
separated across different levels. The ME platform man-
agement includes a platform manager and a VI Manager
(VIM). The ME system level management operates as an
orchestrator. Thus, its main responsibilities include func-
tionalities such as performing the optimal service provi-
sioning (considering the ME VI available resources) and
preparation of the ME virtual infrastructure (for deploying
applications). Moreover, it maintains the ME resources (e.g.,
topology, available ME host resources, etc.) by triggering
the instantiation, relocation and termination of applications
It also carries out integrity and authenticity checks for the
ME application packages and does policy enforcement. The
Operations Support System (OSS) receives the request for
the ME APP deployment or termination from the Customer
Facing Service (CFS) or directly from user end (UE) applica-
tions and passing the authorised requests to the orchestrator.
To facilitate the communication of UE APPs to the orches-
trator for requesting instantiation and possibly relocation of
ME application, the user application life-cycle management
(LCM) proxy is provided.
Fig. 4. The MEC Reference Architecture [30]
2.2 Security and Resilience Related Challenges
Security and resilience are key issues when considering
MEC services such as messaging, navigators, etc., as well
as privacy of data when this is shared through a MEC
infrastructure (e.g., video, photos, various sensor data).
Resilience has always been a great challenge for cloud
computing, as well as for the MEC model. With regard
to the edge model, it is even more challenging as there
are interactions with various access technologies, such as
WiFi, Bluetooth and LTE; different MEC applications and
multi-tenant infrastructures all render the deployment of
resilience mechanisms a technically challenging problem.
The described reference architecture for the MEC can be
improved by introducing resilience mechanisms across dif-
ferent layers. Resilience can be improved by considering
relevant requirements when provisioning a MEC applica-
tion and by deploying monitoring mechanisms to become
aware of the current resilience level of the system/network.
To improve our understanding of the security and resilience
challenges for MEC, we consider threats and challenges that
may target the MEC model. In [31], there is an attempt to
summarise these threats across the various levels in MEC –
the main issues are listed in the following.
Infrastructure Threats: The edge network infrastructure
is part of the ‘last-mile network’, and thus exploits different
technologies to build the network. This makes the edge
infrastructure prone to several attacks. For example, Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks and wireless jamming can easily
consume the bandwidth, frequency band and computing
resources at the edge. Man-in-the-middle attack is another
example; it is used to inject or eavesdrop traffic from the
edge. In addition, wireless communication technologies –
being the dominant edge networking technology – make
data accessing over the air a more probable source of attack.
Virtualisation: The MEC faces also various threats and
challenges related to the virtualisation technology, which is
usually deployed to share the resources of the MEC. Such
attacks include, but are not limited to, DoS attacks, where a
single or multiple malicious virtual machine(s) can deplete
the host computing/networking resources shared between
all VMs. Rogue VMs can run malicious applications for
hacking other VMs or used for eavesdropping data.
Privacy leakage: Adversaries can gain access to the in-
formation store in the edge cloud. The extent of the leakage
is limited as the MEC stores information only about local
users. However, the type of information in these stores
(users’ personal information) makes this one of the great
challenges in deploying edge cloud. Encryption can be a
solution to this challenge.
2.3 Future Directions
5G is the next generation of mobile communication and
MEC is considered likely to help make it a success. The stan-
dardisation research bodies such as ETSI and open source
communities (e.g., ONS and M-CORD project) already con-
tributed in defining the MEC reference architecture. How-
ever, the concepts of security and resilience have not been
addressed adequately when designing the MEC framework.
Thus, better integration of security, resilience and privacy
preserving mechanisms in the MEC reference architecture
should be amongst the future directions. Another potential
future direction could be the merging of activities in NFV
and MEC. The deployment of MEC using an NFV environ-
ment is under investigation by a newly established working
group within ETSI. Specifically, the goal is the integration of
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the MEC and NFV [32]. Toward that direction Sciancalepore
et al. proposed MANO+ in [33] as the result of comparing
two reference architectures for the management of MEC and
NFV.
3 FOG COMPUTING
The Fog Computing model is conceived as an extension of the
cloud. The term ‘fog’ was originally defined by Cisco in an
attempt to describe the need for an enabling platform that
will be able to cope with the requirements posed by critical
Internet of Things (IoT) services. In [15], fog computing is
characterised as ‘a highly virtualised platform that provides,
compute, storage, and networking services between end devices
and traditional cloud computing data centres, typically, but not
exclusively located at the edge of network.’
Fog computing is usually considered in application
scenarios where data needs to be collected close to the
edge devices; the number of devices is large; devices are
physically distributed; and, there is a requirement for low
latency services [34]. Fig. 1 depicts the conceptual relation
among the cloud, the fog, and the IoT devices. Briefly, IoT
devices consist of sensors that send data to the fog nodes. The
latter can receive feeds from IoT devices in real time, can
run applications for performing operations to the collected
data (e.g. analytic), and provide short term storage of data.
Moreover, fog nodes can send aggregated information to the
cloud, usually in predefined intervals. With regard to the
cloud – it aggregates and collects data from the fog nodes,
and processes it, e.g., performs an analysis of the aggregated
data, which can be used later for decision making purposes.
The cloud can also send new directives to the fog nodes
based on the results of the data analysis to fulfil specific
operational requirements.
3.1 State of the Art
A first implementation of the fog computing concept has
been realised by Cisco. Specifically, IOx is Cisco’s solution
for developing and deploying fog applications. Cisco pro-
vides a framework for hosting applications and services
developed not only by it, but by its partners and third-
party developers. This has been achieved through the de-
velopment of a concrete architecture10 for deploying fog
applications, which consists of four main components, i.e.,
Cisco IOx, fog director, an SDK and development tools, and
fog applications.
The OpenFog Consortium11 was formed in late 2015 by
a variety of founding members, viz. ARM, Cisco, Dell, Intel,
Microsoft and Princeton University, and yet more contribut-
ing ones (e.g., AT&T, Foxconn, Hitachi, etc.), which strive
jointly towards the definition of a reference architecture for
the fog computing model. The consortium has published
(in early 2017) in [35] a working document that provides a
description of a high-level system architecture for fog nodes
and networks. The main pillars that are examined in the
context of an architecture include ‘... security, scalability, open-




agility, hierarchy, and programmability’. The investigation of
these main pillars will eventually result in coping with the
main challenges of fog computing.
3.2 Security and Resilience Related Requirements
Although several security and resilience requirements in
the fog may be the same as in the cloud – as a result of
both being virtualised platforms – we attempt to elicit, in
the following, requirements that are related more to the fog
model.
Security is defined by the OpenFog Consortium as one of
the main pillars for investigation in fog computing. Specif-
ically, end-to-end security is required for all applications
in the fog model, and thus requiring several attributes of
security to be examined, viz. ‘... privacy, anonymity, integrity,
trust, attestation ...’ [35].
Privacy of data in fog computing is a requirement that
has to be fulfilled when considering the analysis of sensi-
tive information. In support of this requirement, optimal
selection of fog nodes to conduct potential data analysis
processes will be considered.
Data collected, conveyed, and processed in the fog needs
to be appropriately anonymised. Nevertheless, information
from data must be carefully removed in order not to affect
any inter-connected processes using that information (e.g.,
intrusion detection system, anomaly detection algorithms,
etc.), preserving at the same time the required level of
anonymity.
The integrity and availability of the fog computing in-
frastructure and of data must not be compromised [34]. This
stems from the need for the fog to operate reliably. Specif-
ically, IoT devices are required to cope with an abundance
of data that may affect decision-making processes, and thus
may have a great impact on people – especially in the case
of using the fog to host critical services.
Trust models and reputation systems are also considered
to be an importance aspect in the fog. Yi et al., in [36]
refer to these requirements and highlight the need for a
solution applicable in fog computing. Among other solu-
tions, technologies such as Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT) along with Trusted Platform Module (TPM) have been
discussed in the literature for ensuring such requirements.
In addition to the investigation of trust models, attestation
must be ensured. Attestation is considered as allowing a
remote device to formally prove (e.g. through the use of
a cryptographic scheme) its trustworthiness to a remote
verifier [37].
In the presence of network challenges, resilience must be
ensured in the fog nodes [38]. This requires the monitoring
of the fog infrastructure, prompt detection of challenges
that disrupt the normal operation of the network/system,
and attempting to mitigate and ultimately recover the net-
work/system to its original, normal, operational state.
3.3 Security and Resilience Related Challenges
Although the range of challenges can be quite extensive, we
choose to list in the following a set of security and resilience
related challenges, that need to be overcome in order to
further promote the concept of fog computing.
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Authentication – i.e. the process of verifying the identity
of a user or process – is identified in [39] as a security
issue in application scenarios of using fog computing in
infrastructures such as the Smart Grid. The problem lies
in the way authenticating of smart metering devices on
the edge (i.e. at the consumer) is done, which involves the
threats of tampering the device, reporting false data, etc. In
order to overcome this issue, proposed approaches embrace
cryptographic schemes, e.g. key exchange algorithms and
use of a public key infrastructure. However, these solutions
do not scale well in these environments [40], and emerging
technologies are also considered in that context (e.g. biomet-
rics).
The level of heterogeneity and the distributed nature
of the devices in fog computing may raise issues when it
comes to access control. Access control offers mechanisms
to control and limit the actions or operations that are per-
formed by a user or process on a set of objects, i.e. system
resources. Inter-domain collaboration among systems may
need to ensure additional security concepts such as that of
secure inter-operation among the resources in the fog [41],
[42], [43]. Although several solutions cope with secure inter-
operation, their application in the context of fog computing
may need to consider the emergent requirements set by the
fog model.
Resilience covers several aspects in a network or system,
namely, defence and detect mechanisms, as well as reme-
diation and recovery strategies. The fog computing model
imposes a great diversity in devices, network communi-
cation links, applications, etc., and thus makes its security
a cumbersome process [44]. Sometimes resilience is exam-
ined and ensured on a single layer of an architecture (e.g.,
physical layer, network layer, etc.). However, we argue that
resilience in the fog – as well as in other models and architec-
tures – needs to be examined on multiple layers, including
the investigation of potential interconnections between the
layers. Examining resilience merely on a single layer would
eventually fail to deliver the required level of resilience for
the fog.
3.4 Future Directions
In this section, we briefly refer to future directions with
regards to fog computing
Standardisation of the fog framework can be a future
direction for fog computing. This could be conducted by
standardisation bodies and/or major firms, forums, and
consortia related with the fog model. Currently, the Open-
Fog Consortium appears to provide information with regard
to the system architecture for fog nodes and networks. This
information describes a high-level view of them, but future
steps are directed to the provision of low-level and detailed
information for such architectures, including a list of formal
requirements that will set the basis for test-beds.
We also strongly believe in the need for considering and
elevating the importance of resilience in the fog – several
pillars are considered in existing documented frameworks,
but resilience is not covered explicitly. We advocate this
requirement because several security approaches may fail,
and thus resilience should be supported intrinsically to cope
with such failures. Security controls and mechanisms offer a
considerable level of protection, but in practise these may
fail (e.g. poor implementations). Resilience embraces the
idea that networks/systems must have the right mecha-
nisms in place to promptly identify and avoid challenges
to the normal operation of a network/system. Furthermore,
in the case of a challenge, the network/system needs to
be in a position to mitigate and recover to its original,
normal operation. Thus, we advocate that the definition
of resilience requirements, and resilience-aware frameworks
(e.g., resilience-by-design, real-time resilience), should be
topics for future investigation.
4 SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR THE CLOUD
The introduction of the extended cloud platform must not
affect network availability. Hence, a cloud provider should
offer the level of resilience and address the high-availability
requirements demanded by its users, tenants and their ap-
plications. In case of an adverse event, a resilience mech-
anism is required to promptly detect it and limit its ef-
fects on the normal operation of the system, and thus, for
the cloud to be robust and resilient. Specifically, offering
protection against any performance related anomalies such
as mis-configuration will require a cloud platform to have
the appropriate detection and remediation mechanisms to
ensure that the provided level of service is within acceptable
limits. Thus, in the presence of a challenge or a threat
to the system, it has to be ensured that remediation and
recovery measures are in place to prevent any disruption
to the normal operation of the service. In the following, we
discuss such detection and remediation mechanisms, which
will eventually help to engineer resilience in the cloud.
4.1 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection systems identify events that appear to
be anomalous with respect to the normal behaviour of
the system. They have an understanding of normal sys-
tem behaviour and issue alerts whenever the behaviour
changes from the norm. The underlying assumption in
anomaly detection is that such changes are normally caused
by malicious or disrupting events. Anomaly detection has
been studied within diverse research areas and application
domains. However, for cloud environments, anomaly de-
tection techniques are still evolving due to the fact that
they present several challenging problems. For instance, in
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) the customer is respon-
sible for the correct operation of its own software, while
the cloud provider is responsible only for the underlying
infrastructure resources. This increases the importance of
anomaly detection and remediation mechanisms. However,
the detection system is effective only if the alert it generates
is timely, accurate and provide actionable information to the
administrators to respond to potential threats.
In the extended cloud (i.e., edge, fog and core) the net-
work traffic comes from multiple heterogeneous domains.
Moreover, it changes rapidly with respect to its behaviour
patterns due to heterogeneity of the tenants using the cloud
and the elasticity of the exposed services. Under such cir-
cumstances there are many challenges faced by underlying
anomaly detection techniques such as mis-configurations, or
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simply by high volumes of legitimate traffic. The importance
of anomaly detection in such environments is due to the
fact that anomalies in data translate to important actionable
information. For example, in the case of fog, the anomalous
traffic pattern could mean the resource requests from IoT
devices suddenly increase rapidly, therefore causing a form
of denial-of-service attack which could eventually hamper
service availability to authorized users.
Despite the usefulness of anomaly detection, applying it
operationally in the context of the extended cloud involves
many other challenges with regard to performance and scal-
ability. The on-demand provisioning nature of these envi-
ronments necessitates that anomaly detection in the cloud be
based on real time monitoring. Further, real time monitoring
demands can also change significantly over time. Hence,
the detection should not only achieve high scalability, but
also embrace changes in monitoring demands. The detection
must also provide good multi-tenancy support to ensure
that multiple tenants/providers can use anomaly detection
at the same time. Previous research has created scalable
methods for real time data collection [45], [46], to support
online detection based on data mining and machine learning
approaches [47], [48], [49], [50]. However, while monitoring
has been feasible at scale, detection is typically performed
after a volume of monitoring data has been stored on disk,
which impedes the scalability of real time detection.
The authors in [51] carried out an experimental eval-
uation of state-of-the-art anomaly detection techniques to
assess their monitoring and detection capabilities in multi-
tenant cloud infrastructures under elastic behaviour. It is
shown that elasticity of the cloud makes the traffic distri-
bution observed by anomaly detection techniques unstable
and makes it difficult to predict normal behaviour. Dap-
per [52] uses a static sampling strategy which is homo-
geneous across all nodes in the network and thus makes
it inflexible for multi-tier applications running at the core.
Wang et al. [53] proposed the EbAT system to allow the
on-line analysis of multiple metrics obtained from system-
level components (e.g., CPU utilisation, memory utilisation,
read/write counts of the OS, etc.). The system showed
potential in detection accuracy and monitoring scalability,
but it was not evaluated in the context of adequately prag-
matic cloud scenarios. Guan et al. [54] and Garfinkel et
al. [55] proposed multi-level anomaly detection techniques
to detect intrusions at different levels of a cloud system. The
techniques appear to be rather inflexible and the application
of those techniques in an operational context requires better
clarification. Similarly, Dastjerdi et al. [56] proposed an
approach based on mobile agents for an intrusion detection
system for cloud systems. However, scalability appears to
be a problem due to the high number of virtual machines
that are required to be attached to the agent. The authors
in [57] present a lightweight real-time detection technique
that is suitable for edge and fog computing environments
and can also address application-related issues which are
manifest in performance anomalies. However, an adequate
evaluation of a cloud-specific scenario is missing.
4.2 Policy based Resilience Management
Management and resilience of the cloud environments are
closely linked. The extended cloud will make it difficult to
plan effective management due to varying user demands,
co-hosted VMs and the arbitrary deployment of multiple
applications. Generally, management policies are used to
govern the behaviour of a system. These management poli-
cies can be generally seen as: ‘the constraints and preferences
on the state or the state transition, of a system and is a guide
on the way to achieving the overall objective which itself is also
represented by a desire system state’ [58].
Challenges to the operation of a cloud infrastructure
can occur rapidly, requiring a quick response in order to
maintain acceptable service levels. In order to mitigate
a challenge, complex multi-phase strategies are required,
which combine various monitoring and detection mecha-
nisms that in turn influence the behaviour of remediation
mechanisms. Policy based management has proven to be
very effective for complex system management as evident
from previous literature. In [59] the authors presented a
cloud resilience management framework that uses policy-
based management techniques for the configuration of re-
silience strategies. These techniques allow descriptions of
real-time adaptation strategies, which are separate from the
implementation of the mechanisms that realise the strategy.
This separation allows changes to be made to strategies
without the need to take resilience mechanisms off-line. At
its core is a control loop comprising of a number of concep-
tual processes that realise the real time aspect of the existing
resilience strategy, and consequently implement resilience
for cloud. The ResumeNet12 project provides blueprints and
design guidelines for a cloud resilience management frame-
work. The proposed resilience strategy can be applied to
deal with challenges in fog and edge platforms to explore
the implications of multi-staged and collaborative detec-
tion. The TClouds13 project targets cloud computing security
and minimization of the widespread concerns about the
security of personal data by putting its focus on privacy
protection in cross-border infrastructures and on ensuring
resilience against failures and attacks. Cloud Controls Matrix
(CCM) [60] is specifically designed to provide fundamental
security principles to guide cloud vendors and to assist
prospective cloud customers in assessing the overall se-
curity risk of a cloud provider. The CSA (Cloud Security
Alliance) CCM (Cloud Control Matrix) provides a control
framework that gives a detailed understanding of security
concepts and principles that are aligned to the Cloud Se-
curity Alliance guidance in 13 domains. The foundations
of the Cloud Security Alliance Control Matrix rest on its
customized relationship to other industry accepted security
standards, regulations, and controls framework such as the
ISO 27001/27002, ISACA CoBIT, PCI and NIST and will
evolve to provide internal control directions for SAS 70
attestations provided by cloud providers.
5 CONCLUSION
In this new era of software-driven communication tech-
nologies (esp. for edge and fog computing), key properties
of security and resilience remain open for further investi-
gation. Some issues with regard to security and resilience
12. www.resumenet.eu
13. www.tclouds-project.eu
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have already been solved in the context of the cloud, and
thus are expected to be resolved in emerging – yet related –
technologies too. This is mostly due to existing similarities
between the cloud and the new software-driven commu-
nication technologies; the latter rely heavily on the main
concepts of the cloud, i.e. elasticity, on-demand service pro-
vision, etc. However, the requirements posed by emerging
services (e.g., low latency, support of location awareness
and mobility, etc.) strongly suggest the need to re-address
security and resilience, and to investigate them in their
new application contexts. Identifying the similarities among
the computing models may also provide useful directions
to their future development. Thus, we anticipate the work
presented in this paper will serve as a precursor to the
further investigation of both security and resilience with
regard to virtualised and software-driven communication
technologies, notably mobile edge computing and the fog.
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